Borovsky's Raid & a primer on the Volunteer Army
Or why the White Army was the closest real-life counterpart to Space Marines from Warhammer 40,000
Our topic today is “Borovsky’s Raid”, a brilliant tactical operation of the Volunteer Army (the first official name of what would become the “Armed Forces of Southern Russia” and later simply the “Russian Army”, popularly known as “White Army” or “White Guard”) during the Second Kuban Campaign in the summer of 1918.
After the First Cuban Campaign, also known as “Ice March”, and the defeat of the Bolsheviks by the Germans in the Ukraine, the Reds retreated to the Caucasus and Kuban. The Second Kuban Campaign was planned as an operation to defeat the North Caucasus Red Army (later reorganized as “11th Army”) and eradicate the Bolshevik presence in the Kuban region, as well as to free Stavropol oblast’, the Black Sea provinces and the Northern Caucasus from communist occupation. At that time, the Volunteer Army consisted of 8,000-9,000 soldiers (“bayonets and sabers”, as they said, meaning infantry and cavalry), which were opposed by over 100,000 Bolsheviks. During the early & late phases of the Civil war, such a ratio was nothing unusual.
The White forces consisted of five divisions staffed with volunteers, veteran officers, and young cadets. General Alexander Alexandrovich Borovsky was in command of the 2nd Division of the Volunteer Army. It included the Kornilovsty “Strike Regiment” and the Partisan Infantry Regiment, also known as Alekseyevtsy. Kornilov’s Own were formed as shock troops after the February Revolution to uphold the rapidly eroding morale in the Russian army. They were known for their incredible bravery and discipline; the Kornilovtsy, named after their leader General Kornilov, were the last functioning unit of the Russian Imperial Army as well as the first unit of the emerging White Army. The Partisan Regiment, named Alekseyevtsy after General Alekseyev, consisted mostly of Don Cossacks and Light Infantry. They were responsible for scouting and guerilla tactics in the early days of the White struggle.
The operation I want to tell you about was assigned to Borovsky because, in Denikin's words, "he never spoke about the small size of his troops". In translation: even when the Reds had an appalling numerical superiority, Borovsky did not think twice about it, but threw the Kornilovsty and Alekseyevtsy into the meat grinder where they performed wonders of heroism and valor. At the same time, he never disappointed high command and managed to fulfill even the most dangerous and implausible combat missions, often dancing on the blade of a razor and achieving victory solely through fury and speed. It is well known that the White Army’s elite units often managed to beat the Reds at a ratio of 25 to 1. Twenty-five “Red Army men” to one Kornilovets - the latter were not recruited from ordinary people; they were recruited from gods of war.
Due to these superhuman warriors not caring about numerical superiority, Commander-in-Chief Denikin was able to pull away large forces (admittedly a rather vague concept in an “army” of 8,000) for the combat operations which would later become known as “Borovsky’s Raid”. The key task of the raid was to knock the Reds out of several villages and thus prepare an attack on Tikhoretskaya station, an important railway junction in the region. Here is an excerpt from Denikin's pre-raid briefing with Borovsky:
- It is necessary to defeat the Bolsheviks at Medvezhya, Uspenskaya and Ilyinskaya within three days, so that we can regroup on the 30th near Ilyinskaya, from where we will prepare the attack on Tikhoretskaya, which is planned for the 1st of July…
- Yes, sir.
- Alexander Alexandrovich, have you considered that you will have to deal with 115 miles of road and six thousand Reds?
- It will be done.
- Can you move out tomorrow at dawn?
- I will move out today at dusk…
The 2nd division had less than two thousand “bayonets and sabres”. In addition to the Kornilovtsy and Alekseyevtsy, it included the Kuban Plastun Battalion (a plastun is a cossack who is so angry that he ditches his horse and comes for you on foot) of Colonel Ulagay and several other Kuban Cossack units, all of whom were quite fierce. Considering the Volunteer Army only consisted of 8000 men, Borovsky’s Raid was a major operation. In the first battle for the village of Medvezhya, the Kornilovtsy attacked a hill ridge occupied by the Reds. Tactically speaking, the only viable direction of attack was across a nearby river. So, they waded through neck-deep water while Red machine guns fired upon them from heavily fortified positions; or, as the Kornilovtsy called it, “a normal Wednesday”.
Immediately after getting out of the river, soaking wet and cursing, they commenced a bayonet charge. Kornilov’s Own climbed the hills while taking heavy fire and easily crushed the communists, taking only minimal losses themselves. A handful of Kornilovtsy utterly destroyed the fighting spirit of three to four thousand Reds; even the sailor companies, who put up fierce resistance, couldn’t change a thing. Minutes after the infantry engaged the Communists in melee, a daring charge by Kuban Cossacks, who had flanked the enemy in the meanwhile, finished the battle before it even really started. In this first skirmish, Borovsky’s troops took minimal casualties (136 dead and wounded) while taking two thousand Red Army men prisoner.
At the dawn of the next day, the division’s vanguard came into contact with the enemy, who reacted by retreating in panic. Since Borovsky’s troops had already destroyed the enemy's main forces, they continued to move on Tikhoretskaya station. The Bolsheviks retreated in the same direction; a decisive battle loomed. On their way to Tikhoretskaya, local residents helped the Whites in every way possible, fed them, brought them clothes and water and even bolstered their ranks with new volunteers. The Reds were unable to offer any serious resistance. Kornilov's Strike Regiment was ordered to surround Tikhoretskaya from the South, cutting off the railway line to Kavkazskaya station. Having crushed all Bolshevik forces on their way, Borovsky's division undercut the Reds' material base - they hurriedly retreated and left behind wagons, machine guns and even armored trains.
In a little over two days, the 2nd Division not only covered a distance of 135 miles (115 to Ilyinskaya plus 20 to bypass Tikharetskaya), but also cut the railway to Kavkazskaya, continued hitting the enemy with lightning attacks (at this speed, there is no time for tactical maneuvers) and only lost 300 men. That's a lot for the Kornilovtsy, of course. A quarter of the regiment was out of action, but compared to the enemy's strength and the overall situation, the losses were negligible. Later, there were to be campaigns where taking 300% losses (that means if they started out with 1000 men, they lost 3000, including reinforcements) over a few weeks was completely par for the course for the White Guard’s elite regiments.
Next was the main goal of the raid: taking Tikhoretskaya. During the savage battle that lasted until late at night, the Reds were completely defeated and fled towards Yekaterinodar (which the Whites later also took). The Bolsheviks were utterly vanquished. From an official operational summary: "The army trophies are huge: three armored trains, an airplane, many machine guns (50), a large number of firearms and other ammunition (including armor-piercing), a lot of intendant's property were seized.”
As everywhere else, the Volunteer Army’s forces were met as liberators from Red tyranny. Thus, Borovsky's raid, a prototype of a future motorized Blitzkrieg, met the exact deadline set by General Denikin's plan. Without any armor, supplies or reinforcements. Even in these dire circumstances, they managed to inflict a total tactical and strategic defeat on the Bolsheviks. Other officers wrote about the raid that it "proceeded with cinematic speed.” It was also as plausible as an 80’s Action movie. And yet it happened.
The Second Kuban Campaign continued the same way. The Whites took Yekaterinodar, Armavir, Novorossiysk, Stavropol. 8500-9000 “bayonets and sabres” of the Volunteer Army purged a hundred thousand Red Army soldiers from the region. The 11th Red Army ceased to exist as a strategical unit; the whole South of Russia was at the mercy of Denikin.
Later, there were defeats to come; there would be mistakes, failures and betrayals. But during the summer of 1918, the Reds learned that hysterical propaganda about “lazy inbred Tsarist generals” won’t save you when those Tsarist generals decide to come for you.
Fun stuff, but could use some maps.